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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a workman's compensation case seeking
review of an order issued by the Utah State Industrial
Commission denying Plaintiff, Grover Odekirk, disability
benefits from the "Special Fund" also known as the "Combined Injury Fund," established by §35-1-69 Utah Code
Annotated (1953).
DISPOSITION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Plaintiff, Grover Odekirk, filed a workman's
compensation claim on June 30, 1976 (R. 25).
was held December 7, 1976 (R. 48).

Hearing

On March 14, 1977,

the matter was referred to a Medical Panel (R. 120).
Thereafter, Administrative Law Judge, Joseph

c.

Foley,

awarded Plaintiff certain permanent partial disability
benefits from the Employer and Insurer as well as medical
expenses, in particular all costs incurred for psychiatric
therapy for one year's time, subject to further review
(R. 243).

Judge Foley further required the Plaintiff's

psychiatrist, Dr. Reed Andrus, to submit written reports
on Plaintiff's progress and treatment.
On December 15, 1978, Judge Foley ordered the
insurance carrier to pay for an additional six months of
continued therapy (R. 269).
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On May 23, 1979 Plaintiff moved for an order
requiring the Insurer to pay for an additional 20
psychiatric visits (R. 283).

Judge Foley granted this

motion on June 1, 1979 (R. 285).
The Insurer made a timely motion to review that
order as well as requesting modification of previous orders
of November 17, 1977 and December 15, 1978 (R. 289).
Plaintiff applied for benefits from the Special
Fund (R. 299).

On July 17, 1979, without further hearing

the Industrial Commission affirmed the Administrative Law
Judge and denied Plaintiff's application for benefits from
the Special Fund (R. 303).
On August 16, 1979, Plaintiff petitioned this
Court for review of the denial of benefits from the Special
Fund.

The Employer and Insurer as well petitioned the Court

for writ of review at the same time.

Thereafter, the

matter was consolidated upon the stipulation and motion of
Plaintiff's counsels for the reason that both actions involved
conunon questions of law and fact arising out of the same
alleged industrial accident and injury and consolidation would
avoid unnecessary costs and delay.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Plaintiff, Grover Odekirk, seeks an order setting
aside Defendants' denial of benefits from the Special Fund
and awarding the same.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Plaintiff is a 51 year old man who has worked
all his adult life as a truck driver, mainly in interstate
traffic.
On January 5, 1974 while employed by IML Freight,
he lost control of the truck he was operating due to snow
and slippery road conditions.

The truck jackknifed, collided

with the bank of the road and threw Plaintiff against the
framework of the cab door, injurying his head and snapping
or popping his neck (R. 55).
After the accident, he was off work to February
24, 1974.

However, when he returned to work, his symptoms

would become aggravated, and there would be periods of time
off the job.

Dr. Holbrook admitted him to St. Mark's

Hospital on October 16, 1974 for rest, therapy, traction
and muscle relaxers.

In November, 1974 he was treated by

Dr. Baer at Holy Cross Hospital by acupuncture.
intermittently on and off work until May, 1974.

He was
During

this time he began to experience severe depression and his
family physician referred him to Dr. Reed Andrus.
foregoing facts at R. 120.)

He was off work from May 12,

1975 until November, 1975 (R. 57, 58).
job until May, 1976 (R. 59).

(The

He returned to the

At that time he had a severe

depression, attempted suicide (R. 59) and could not continue
working due to the severe pain in his head.

He stated,
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"Well, everytime when I was out on that truck, I couldn't
drive the thing but an hour and my head would start to
explode.

And, at the time that happened, right down

in-between my shoulders here I would get a pain in my back
right in the center that was just like a toothache.
time my heart beat, my head would be like this."

Every-

(R. 59).

In March, 1977 he was seen by Dr. Erickson who reported
Plaintiff continued to have headaches, tenseness and soreness in shoulder and neck with increasing episodes of
aching in the hands from the elbow level down with lack
of strength and sensation of the hands (R. 126).
His previous medical history in part includes
an accident in January, 1960 when he was thrown out of a
tanker (R 203).

In 1970 due to stiff necks and headaches,

Dr. Holbrook performed an anterior cervical disc excision
and interbody fusion at CS-6 (R. 113).

Mr. Odekirk testifiec

that prior to the accident he had never experienced the
depression, feelings of despair or suicidal inclinations
from which he suffered (R. 62).

He had been a heavy drinker

and because of it decided to quit drinking all together
in December, 1973.

He did not drink since that time (R. 61).

The Medical Panel reviewed a rather thorough
medical file and reported after their own examination as
follows:
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Mr. Odekirk's total permanent physical

impairment from all causes was 60 percent of the whole
man.

This was calculated by combining 4S percent loss

of body function for psychiatric impairment with 2S
percent loss of body function for pseudoarthrosis cervical
spine with traumatic aggravation.
2.

Ten percent of the 4S percent psychiatric

impairment was due from the industrial accident of January
S, 1974.
3.

The degree of permanent impairment preexisting

the industrial accident was SO percent loss of body function.
This included 3S percent due to psychiatric problems combined with 20 percent loss due to previous arthrodesis
of CS-CG.
4.

Psychiatric treatment was absolutely necessary.

(R. 209, 210)

Since the time of the accident,he recieved
psychotherapy from Dr. Andrus but it was often interrupted
by the uncertainty over the insurance coverage due to the
appeals by the insurance carrier.
May 17, 1979, R. 282)

(Letter of Dr. Andrus.

He has not been gainfully employed

since May 1976.
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ARGUMENT
I

THE SPECIAL FUND PROVIDES DISABILITY
BENEFITS TO THE PLAINTIFF.
The Special Fund established in §35-1-69,
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), provides disability benefits to workers with a preexisting incapacity
who then sustain an industrial injury resulting in a
permanent incapacity substantially greater than he would
have incurred if he had not had the preexisting incapacity.
The Medical Panel recognized that the Plaintiff
was severely disabled, to the extent of 60 percent of the
whole man (R. 209).

His preexisting incapacity consisted

of 20 percent loss of body function due to previous arthrodesis of C5-C6 (cervical spine) with pseudoarthrosis
(failure of fusion).

(R. 209).

The Panel psychiatrist felt that he had a psychiatric impairment of 45 percent loss of body function, 10
percent of which was due to the accident (R. 210).
His treating psychiatrist stated that the industria:
accident combined with his own personality makeup, occupatio~
background, forced inactivity, dependancy, inability to
lead a productive life, deep seated feelings of inadequacy,
worthlessness, hopelessness, all of which were aggravated
by physical symptoms and fears of other accidents led to
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severe depression and total occupational disability in
the only trade in which he had been gainfully employed.
(R.

47)
Plaintiff's preexisting impairments had not been

disabilitating.
driver.

He was employable as an interstate truck

He was no longer drinking alcohol.

require the services of a psychiatrist.

He did not

He did not suffer

from pain in his head or neck and had made a successful
recovery from his operation in 1970 (R. 140).
Essentially, his preexisting conditions and
disabilities were dormant up to January 5, 1974.

Had they

not existed at all on that date, the industrial accident
would have caused but a rather minor injury to his head.
It certainly would not have led to occupational disability.
The accident severely aggravated his preexisting
conditions, all of which were complicated by an apparent
disposure towards depression.

As a result a 60 percent

permanent partial disability was determined after the accident.
This is substantially greater than he would have had, if
there had been no preexisting disability.

Sixty percent

is substantially greater than 15 percent.
In practical terms, the accident caused and created
an occupational disability.

The lack of fusion in his neck

and the aggravation caused to it by the accident along with
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-athe concomitant psychiatric problems, created a substantial
work-related disability, requiring prolonged psychotherapy.
Imagine the case of an employee with total
blindness in one eye.

If this person thereafter suffers

an industrial injury totally blinding his other good eye,
the resulting incapacity would be total blindness.

Prior

to the accident, this man had been employable, although
handicapped.

After the accident, he is totally disabled.

Special Fund benefits are most appropriate in this case.
The result is no different for Plaintiff Odekirk.
This case is very similar to Intermountain
Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega, 562

P~2d

617 (1977).

In

that case the Court held that medical expenses as well as
compensation award should have been apportioned among the
employer and the Special Fund.

Id. at 619.

The facts

stated there, similar to the instant matter, recognize
claimant had preexisting psychiatric impairment.

The

Court stated:
"The position of the Defendant as
reflected in the Commission's order
seems to be predicated on the assumption
that because the pre-existing condition
was quiescent and did not require medical treatment until the accident, the
plaintiff employer should be held responsible for the entire expense thereof.
But it will be noted that the statue
makes no distinction between the award
for compensation and medical expenses;
and that if the requirement of the
statute is met, that is, if the resulting permanent incapacity is substantially
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greater than if the pre-existing
incapacity had not existed, the
proportional causation must be
found and that portion attributable
to the previous condition paid
out of the Special Fund." Id. at
619.
The criteria for determining what is substantially
greater was set forth in Ortega as follows:
"It surely cannot be doubted that
30 percent is substantially greater than
20 percent, nor that 10 percent disability
is itself substantial in that it is
definite and measureable. Consequently,
inasmuch as it appears that the preexisting condition increased the resulting disability by one-third, it follows
that under the requirements of the statute,
the medical expenses as well as the compensation award should have been apportioned
two-thirds from the employer and one-third
from the Special Fund." Id. at 619.
In the case at bar, the resulting disability
of 60 percent is substantially greater than 15 percent.
The resulting disability is definite and measureable.
The work-related disability .i:s obvious.

Th~inescapable

\

conclusion is that benefits from the Speciaf Fund should
be allowed.
The uncontradicted medical evidence on file in
this matter supports the conclusion that Plaintiff's resulting disability is substantially greater than what it would
have been, but for no preexisting disability.

The legal

conclusions drawn by the Industrial Commission that this
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-10evidence does not indicate a supstantially greater disability, is in error and not supported by the record.

As

a conclusion of law, it is reviewable and reversible by
this Court.

Wheritt v. Industrial Commission,

u.

68,

110 P.2d 374.
Plaintiff Odekirk has lived with persistent
pain in his head and neck since 1974 and has been coping
with severe continuous disabling depression and occupational'
disability.

The award from the Employer, based on 15

percent permanent partial disability, is wholly inadequate
to compensate him for his disabilities.

The Special Fund

should be held liable for the amounts remaining based on a
60 percent disability.

II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
EXERCISE ITS JURISDICTION
AND DETERMINE PLAINTIFF'S
BENEFITS FROM THE SPECIAL

FAILED TO
PROPERLY
RIGHTS TO
FUND.

The Industrial Commission had exercised its
jurisdiction to award and require Plaintiff's employer and
the insurance company to pay for his psychiatric expenses.
The Medical Panel indicated that psychotherapy was essential
(R. 210).

Unfortunately, due to the fact the insurance

carrier contested its liability in this regard, much of the
psychotherapy was interrupted because of prohibited cost.
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This even led to a moderate relapse (R. 282, 301).
Therefore, psychotherapy has not been of the value that
may have been contemplated, and the Plaintiff has continued
to suffer.

Although the insurance carrier certainly is

entitled to appellate procedures, the necessary delay caused
by the same has led to great hardship in the case of the
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's application for Special Fund benefits
is justified in time now due to the reasons previously
set forth.

Certainly his entitlement to benefits is as

justified, if not more so, than the insurance carriers.
However, his application for compensation from the Special
Fund was denied w±thout so much as the benefit of a re•hearing.
In the case Buxton v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
587 P.2d 121, this court reversed the Industrial Commission's
refusals to make findings and an award regarding Claimant's
application for permanent total disability benefits to be
paid out of the Special Fund.

The Court held:

"The Commission's jurisdiction to
act on an application for modification
of a previous order derives from §78 of
the Act. That section empowers the
Commission to make such rnodif ication of
former findings and orders as 'in its
opinion may be justified.' The section
has been previously construed to require,
as the basis of modification, evidence
of some significant change or new devel
ment in the claimant's injury or proof.
of the previous award's inadequacy.
(Citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Industrial Commission 19 U.2d, 158,
P.2d
952).Funding
Onforthe
evidence
presente
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-12at the 197S hearing, the Commission
found that the evidence of change or
new development in the injury or
inadequacy of the previous award
was insufficient to justify the
modification of its 1971 findings
from SS percent loss of bodily fur.ction to total disability, the only
modification which would assist
Plaintiff in any way.
Even though the Commission is
obliged to modify previous orders
only when 'in its opinion,' modification is justified, the Commission
is not vested with arbitrary power;
and it cannot simply ignore competent
and credible evidence when there is
nothing discrediting therein and there
is no evidence to the contrary .••
it is the Commission's duty to determine whether that loss of function
represents total disability in terms
of capacity to perform remunerative
employment, and the determination
must be made on competent evidence."
S87 P.2d at 123 (1978).
In the instant case the Industrial Commission
totally ignored the application, the evidence before it, and
the various

issue~

put before it by counsel for both Plain-

tiff and the insurance carrier, flatly denying the petitions,
without so much as a word as to indicate its reasoning justi·
fying the denial as required by statute.
and capricious.

This is arbitrary

The Commission should be reversed.

Plaintiff Odekirk has suffered a great ordeal since
even the time of the original hearing in 1976.
to that time, the Ortega case was issued.

Subsequent

As well, the
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-13Administrative Law Judge issued several orders in regards
to psychiatric treatment but the effect of those orders
was nullified by economic realities in the face of appeals
by the insurance carrier.
This matter should be remanded back to the
Industrial Commission and an award made based on Plaintiff's
application for benefits from the Special Fund.
CONCLUS'ION
Plaintiff's application for benefits from the
Special Fund was arbitrarily and capriciously denied.
Plaintiff suffers from a disability that resulted from
his industrial injury of January 5, 1974 and was substantially greater than it would have been had he had
no preexisting disabilities.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays for
an award of compensation from the "Special Fund" after
the Employer's liability has been first deducted.
Dated this

day of

1979.

ARTHUR F. SANDACK
Attorney for Plaintiff
370 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-0555
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